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FOREWORD
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. When the Editor invited Professor
J. N. D. Anderson to contribute an article on Islamic Law in Africa to the present
symposium, he indicated that in his judgment, discussion should focus on two points
which-to him-seemed to merit special attention, to wit: (i) whether a modern
society can long remain viable if it has an interpersonal conflict of laws system; (2)
whether a revealed divine law is or can be rendered sufficiently adaptable for the
purposes of resolving the typical conflicts of an industrial society. With obliging
candor, Professor Anderson starts off his paper by observing that these two questions
are not infrequently asked "by those who approach the subject... with a general idea
as to the nature of (Islamic) law but a limited acquaintance with legal developments,
during the last century or more, in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the
dependent or formerly dependent territories of East and West Africa."'
Professor Anderson's contribution convincingly demonstrates that the two issues
singled out by the Editor are neither unique to Africa, nor as important as is often
assumed, nor finally really detrimental to national advance in the African states.
The same observation can probably be made about most other legal problems currently arising in the new African states. It would seem, therefore, that the uniqueness
of African legal problems does not primarily lie in the-at least to Western observersunusual and frequently archaic character of major legal institutions to be found in
the various African states. It is, rather, the clash between a truly singular cumulation of such institutions and an equally unprecedented pressure for the speedy
attainment of modernity that makes African legal problems so unique.
If the above observations are correct, much of what has been written about African
law by comparative and international lawyers will require a careful re-examination.
This would appear to be especially the case with respect to attempts to deduce
"general principles of law"2 from various African legal institutions. For instance,
the discussion of various African tribal laws in C. Wilfred Jenks' Common Law of
Mankind (the most ambitious effort so far in the direction of establishing a world
legal system by comparative research) would appear to rely largely on those institutions which-not necessarily typical to Africa but fairly often witnessed in traditional,
pre-industrial societies-are 'among the first to be swept away by the tide of
'Anderson, The Future of Islamic Law in British Commonwealth Territories in Africa, infra p. 617.
See generally Schlesinger, Research on the GeneralPrinciples of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations,
5I Am. J. IlT'L L. 734 (1957); id., The Common Core of Legal Systems: An EmergingSubject for Comparative Study, XXai CENTURY CoMA,,vArVE AND CoNFLiCTS LAw (LEGnA. EssAYs IN HONOR OF HESSEL

E. YNTEmA) 65 (x961).
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modernity 3 Learned references to Ashanti "constitutional" law fade into insignificance when confronted with the hard facts of the constitution of Ghana.4 The
same observations seemingly appear with at least equal force to present attempts
to establish universal legal rules in favor of the status quo-such as the "sanctity" of
contracts-on the basis of traditional or divine law. One might well doubt the
historical validity of such research. It seems, for instance, hard to believe that
capitulations, Mixed Courts, and the introduction of Western law were really misguided acts by the colonial powers because Islamic law as actually in operation
afforded all the security and justice needed. But quite aside from this, it appears
abundantly clear that especially in the areas of law to which such studies apply
(contracts, commercial law, public law), traditional law has been or is being rapidly
swept away by Western-type institutions. And it seems rather difficult to unearth
many "general principles" in the steadily crumbling bulwarks of traditional or
religious law: status, family, and succession.
This is not to say that the new African states hold nothing of interest to
students of comparative and international law. It is merely suggested that studies
which focus on traditional and religious legal institutions are highly prone to be
misleading or even mischievous-misleading because the institutions referred to are
on the periphery even now and are rapidly melting away; mischievous because any
emphasis on traditional or divine law necessarily poses ideological obstacles to the
legal reforms which the African states must undertake in order to attain modernity.
Let us now turn to some practical examples. In the field of international law, for
instance, it is submitted that little can be gained from scanning frequently obscure
tribal and religious customs for evidence of "general principles of law." The new
African states accept international law; several of them are currently before the
International Court of Justice as plaintiffs against "white" powers.' They do not
challenge the legal force of treaties concluded by free negotiation after independence.
But they do worry about the status of pre-independence treaty obligations entered
into by the colonial power; and they do object to the unilateral imposition of quite
:frequently disputed rules of customary international law which they did not help
develop. 7
Is such an attitude towards international law really to any appreciable extent the
manifestation of a unique law-culture? It seems much more sensible to assume
that at least as regards customary international law, the new African states are
' See, e.g., C.
112.

WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 91, 126, 127-28 (1958), but cf. id. at
For criticism, see especially Stone, A Common Law of Mankind?, I INTERNATIONAL STuDIES 414

(India 196o).
"See JENKS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 128; F.A.R. BENNION, THE CONSTrurON o' GHANA (1962);
LESLIE RUDiN & PAul. MuRRAY, THE CoNsrrTtusoN AND GOVERNMENT OF GHANA (x96x).
'As exemplified by Habachy, Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
450 (1962).

' The South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections,
:962 I.C.J. Reports 3x9; Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), cf.
Order of April 25, 1962, 1962 I.C.J. Reports 3.

7 See Anand, Rdle of the "New" Asian-African Countries in the Present International Legal Order,
56 AM. J. INT'L L. 383 (x962); and Stone, supra note 3.
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merely assuming the position indicated by the present stage of their economic development and by their national ambitions. They seek to avoid, or at any rate to
minimize, the constraints imposed by an international custom which was created
almost entirely by the capital-exporting countries.8
With respect to treaties, we seem to be faced by a series of "typical" cases of

state succession, with, however, the distinguishing mark that the problem has not
arisen until now with such pressing force and on such a large scale. It is estimated,
for instance, that there are some 3 oo-odd British treaties which might be applicable
to Nigeria. By exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of the Federation of
Nigeria and the United Kingdom High Commissioner on the very day of independence, the Federation Government assumed all rights and obligations stipulated by
international agreements entered into "on their behalf" before independence, and
undertook to keep such agreements in force "until such time as the Government
of Nigeria can consider whether they require modification or renegotiation in any
respect."9 Nigeria was faced with three major questions in this connection: Which
agreements are applicable to Nigeria? (For a country which has just reached
independence and is still in the process of setting up a Foreign Office, this is no
mean question.) Will the other contracting parties regard themselves to be bound
as against Nigeria? How can the various agreements be denounced, and which
agreements should be terminated?
Another new African state, Tanganyika, has attempted a different solution of
the treaty problem. Instead of concluding an "inheritance agreement" with the United
Kingdom, Tanganyika has filed a formal declaration with the Secretary General of
the United Nations. Pursuant to this declaration, all valid bilateral treaties are kept
in force on the basis of reciprocity for a trial period of two years, pending negotiations
as to eventual readjustments. Multilateral treaties are to be dealt with by ad hoc
agreements but Tanganyika undertakes to treat such agreements "as being in force
vis-a-vis other States who rely on them in their relations with Tanganyika."'"
Both solutions are seemingly unexceptionable under traditional international law.
Since almost all relevant agreements can be terminated unilaterally by appropriate,
relatively short-term notice, the essential legal problem is the question as to the
extent of the other parties' obligation toward the new states. Vastly more complicated is the issue of the legality of pre-independence agreements between the former
colonial powers and the emerging African states on the eve of independence.
As a rule, the former colonial power will seek guarantees in three distinct fields:
the continued recognition of pre-independence obligations of the colonial administra-

tion, particularly of civil service tenure and pension rights; 1 the continued pro8

See Friedmann, The Changing Dimensions of International Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1151

(x962).
'Quoted by Cole, The Independence Constitution of Federal Nigeria, in ROBERT 0. TILmAN & R.
TAYLOR COLE (EDs.), THE NIGERIAN PoLrscA. SCENE 63, 66 (1962). See also id. at 77-78.
"0See Note, Problem of State Succession in Africa: Statement of the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, ix
INT'L & Comrp. L. Q. 1210, 1211-12 (1962).
"1See SIR CHARLES JEFFRIES, THE TRANSFER OF POWER (I96I); KENNETH YOUNGER, THE PUBLIC
SERVICE IN NEW STATES (I960).
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tection of minorities-not necessarily European subjects-whom the colonial powers
had undertaken to protect against the dominant local ethnic or religious groups;
and finally, the continued preferential treatment of the former colonial power and
its nationals, especially in matters of trade, investment, and the like.
While such guarantees, or some of them, could be incorporated into the independence constitutions enacted by the colonial power, such constitutional protection had
already proved to be insufficient. For once independence was attained, the former
dependency could-as the Union of South Africa eventually did--repeal or amend
its constitution. Even the abolition of an "unamendable" constitutional provision by
revolutionary action would not be a violation of international law, as international
law does not guarantee the constitutional form of sovereign states.
In their search for more abiding securities, at least two European powers-France
and Belgium-turned to the novel expedient of a pre-independence international
agreement with the emerging nations. The Loi fondamentale of the Congo, enacted
in the form of a Belgian statute of May 19, i96o, provided in its article 49 that
even before independence, the Government of the Congo could conclude a general
treaty of friendship, assistance, and cooperation with Belgium, as well as particular
conventions on the details of post-independence cooperation within the framework
of such a treaty."8 A "treaty" was actually concluded between Belgium and the
Congo (as represented by its future government) before independence; it was
14
promptly renounced when the Republic of the Congo became independent.
The second example of a pre-independence agreement is the Evian Agreement
between France and the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), announced
on March i8, I962.P5 As early as September 19, 1958, the F.L.N. had formed a Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Between 1958 and the Evian negotiations, this government had been recognized, either de iure or de facto, by some 25
states. France had consistently treated such acts of recognition as "unfriendly acts,"
and had also consistently denied the legal existence of an Algerian government. On
the-day after the Evian settlement, the Soviet Union extended de iure recognition to
the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. The French Foreign Minister summoned the Soviet Ambassador the same evening, informing him that
neither the cease-fire nor the Evian Agreement had modified the legal status of
Algeria, and that France would exercise both internal and external Algerian
sovereignty until the self-determination plebiscite. When the Soviet Union failed
"5 For a comprehensive discussion of the various phases of process, see EDWARD MCWVHINNEY, JUDICIAL
IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD 98-io8, igo-99 (2d ed. 196o).
REVIEW
15
Loi fondamentale relative aux structures du Congo, [zg6o] MoNIrEuR BELGE 3988, 3992. The
expression used is "conclure" (in the Flemish text, "sluiten"), from which it seems to follow that approval
by the Chambers as provided for by Art. 25, sec. a, was not necessary. In any event, Article 25-if it
follows dominant Belgian opinion on the subject-requires the approval of the Chambers merely for
the internal effectiveness ("effet"), not the international validity of treaties.
" See Franck, United Nations Law in Ifiica: The Congo Operation as a Case Study, inlra, p. 632, at
633, with note z.
"For

an English translation of the Evian Agreements, see i AM ERICAN SOCIETY OF INTF.RNATIONAL
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to react to this announcement, the French Ambassador in Moscow was recalled. 6
Here, we seem to have the unique case of the obligor admitting his capacity to
contract, but the obligee denying it. One should ordinarily suppose that France
would be hard put to affirm Algeria's capacity to contract at the time of the Evian
Agreement, and that Algeria would be equally embarrassed in asserting that the
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was at that time legally inexistent. Yet, obviously, neither side relied on the representations of the other, and
there was in all probability no estoppel as to either.
Are these pre-independence agreements valid treaties? It seems that the Belgian
treaty was a case of self-dealing pure and simple, as the Congolese government-before independence the creature of Belgian legislation-was accorded "international capacity" solely for the purpose of concluding this treaty. As an act of
direct and delegated Belgian sovereignty, the treaty could outlive Congolese independence only if ratified in some form by the Republic of the Congo. On the other
hand, the Evian Agreement was concluded with a government which was anything
but the creature of France. It seems more appropriate to disregard French official
denials of the legal existence of the Algerian government as mere political declarations, and to concede at least de facto authority to the latter government as of March,
1962.

In actual fact, the Belgian-Congolese treaty was denounced after independence;
the French-Algerian agreement was not only approved by the Algerian plebiscite,
but also by the new Algerian government. It remains to be seen whether these
two cases will come to be regarded as precedents for pre-independence international
agreements, a species of treaty born in Africa. In any event, however, the African
states concerned were but reluctant partners in this attempt to develop new rules of
international law.
Our conclusion, then, is that there is at least at the present no typically African
school of thought in public international law, as contrasted with, say, Latin American
doctrine. But what about constitutional law? Is it possible to find specific African
ideas in the constitutions of the new African states? This would certainly seem
to be the case at least to the limited extent that the new constitutions preserve tribal
symbols and institutions, especially chieftaincy. On the whole, however, there
seems little doubt that the new African constitutions draw their inspirations primarily from three European sources: Belgium, France, and Britain (the latter,
usually via the "written" constitutions of India and Australia, and the British North
America Act). Indeed, to an outside observer, the two most striking phenomena in
African public law are not novel indigenous institutions, but first of all, the amazing
"'The above description follows Rousseau, Chronique des faits internationaux,66
DRoIr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 580, 623-32 (1962).
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variation in the application of imported models, and secondly the curious lack of
contagion of United States constitutional law.
The former phenomenon is most strikingly illustrated by the contrast between
President Kasavubu's dismissal of Patrice Lumumba as Premier of the Republic
of the Congo, and the dismissal of Chief Akintola, the Premier of the Western
Region of Nigeria, by the Governor of that Region.
The Kasavubu-Lumumba crisis turned on the interpretation of article 22 of the
Loi fondamentale which provides: "Le chef de l'Etat nomme et revoque le Premier
Ministre et les Ministres." Did this really mean, as it literally seems to imply, that
the Chief of State can dismiss the Prime Minister at will? This would appear to
depend not so much on the wording of article 22 as on the basic characteristics
of the institutions of Chief of State and Premier under the Loi fondamentale. Here,
the constitutional lawyer would in all probability commence with an investigation
of the proceedings of the constitutional convention, in this case, the Round Table
Conference held in Brussels in January and February, 1960. He would establish that
the Conference rejected a United States-type presidency and decided in favor of a
non-political Chief of State, as in Belgium-with, of course, the thought that this
position might conceivably be offered by the grateful Congolese people to the King
of the Belgians.1" A comparison between the Loi fondamentale and the Belgian
constitution of 1831 would then establish that the former is (at least with respect
to the institutions here material) an attempt to re-codify Belgian constitutional law
and convention as it stood in i96o. The relevance of Belgian models, if at all in
doubt, would be definitely settied by article 51, section 2 of the Loi fondamentale
which provides that the Congolese Parliament can request binding interpretations
of the Loi fondamentale from the Belgian parliament-a seemingly senseless provision
if the latter is not to be guided by Belgian experience.
At this point the inquiry would be conveniently narrowed down to the question
whether under Belgian constitutional law as it stood in i96o, the King could
lost the confidence of Parliament.
dismiss a Premier who had not demonstrably
8
not.
could
he
clear:
quite
seems
answer
The
It is common knowledge that the Kasavubu-Lumumba crisis was not approached
by any of the protagonists along the lines sketched above-or, for that matter, any
other essentially legal line. But that is precisely what happened in the similar
though fortunately somewhat less sanguinary constitutional crisis of the Western
Region of Nigeria.
Here, there had been a major rift in the Government party, and 66 of the 124
members of the Region's Assembly had written a letter to the Governor, stating
that the Premier no longer enjoyed their confidence. The Governor thereupon denied
" See FRANrOIS PERIN, LEs INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES DU CONGO INDEPENDANT AU 30 7UIN x960, at 27-29
(ig6o); Debbasch, Le problame constitutionnel congolais, [1962] REVUE Du DRoIr PUBLIC 25, 41-42.
282 PIERRE WIGNY, DROIT CONSTITUnTONNEL 609-12 (1952); Debbasch, supra note 17, at 42-43. Article
65 of the Belgian constitution provides, in terms literally as unconditional as those of article 22 of
the Loi fondamentale: "Le Roi nomine ct rivoque ses ministres."
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to grant a dissolution to the Premier, dismissed him, and appointed a new Premier
in his stead. Chief Akintola, the ousted Premier, challenged his removal from
office in an action before the High Court of the Western Region of Nigeria. That
court referred the constitutional questions raised by the action to the Federal Supreme
Court.
The controversy centered on section 33(10) (a) of the constitution of the Western
Region of Nigeria which provides that the Premier holds office at the Governor's
pleasure, but that the Governor shall not remove the Premier "unless it appears
to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of the majority of the
members of the House of Assembly."' 9 The questions posed in the referral were
whether the Governor could remove the Premier (i) in the absence of a decision
or resolution of no confidence, regularly adopted in the Assembly; or (2)
on the basis of any materials extraneous to the proceedings of the Assembly.
Speaking for the majority of the Federal Supreme Court, Ademola, C.J.F.,
answered the first question in the negative, thereby deciding the issue in favor of
plaintiff. He interpreted section 33(10) in the light of constitutional conventions
obtaining in the United Kingdom and came to the conclusion that "Law and
convention cannot be replaced by party political moves outside the House." The
dissenting justice, Brett, FJ., agreed with the premise that United Kingdom constitutional convention was highly relevant to the issue. He found, however, that there
was no constitutional precedent exactly in point, and consequently felt free to interpret the written constitution of the Western Region in a sense different from
that of the majority °
Why was the issue of the dismissal of a Premier by the Chief of State decided
extra-legally and without recourse to Belgian constitutional practice in the Congo,
but legally and in accordance with United Kingdom constitutional conventions in
Nigeria? The answer may simply lie in the fact that the first two Congolese lawyers
received their degrees from the University of Lovanium in Leopoldville in i96i- --P1
after the "solution" of the constitutional crisis by the tragic death of Patrice Lumumba.
In Nigeria, however, there was no dearth of qualified counsel, at least outside the
m
Northern RegionY
But in all probability, the answer lies somewhere else: in the magic attraction of
the British constitutional model for nations new and old, 3 and in Commonwealth
(Constitution) Order in Council, x96o, Fourth Schedule, SrAT. INsIr., ig6o, No. x652.
Akintola v. Governor of Western Nigeria and Adegbenro (FSC 187/1962). The full text of this
decision was not available to the Editor; the above description relies on the report of Davies, NigeriaSome Recent Decisions on the Constitution, II INt'L & COMp. L. Q. 919, 919-2o, 924-25, and 933-35
5"o
0Nigeria

(x962).

"' See Report, Ripublique du Congo (Liopoldville), in Symposium, "African Legal Education," 6

J.

On legal education in Africa, see also Paul, Legal Education in EnglishAFmucAN LAW 75, 92 (1962).
Speaking Africa, 15 J. LEGAL ED. x89 (1962). "Phineas Phogmore," Aboriginal Legal Education in East
Africa, 14 id. 353 (x962) deals with quite a different subject. It is, to a surprising extent, a satirical
parallel to our plea not to seek too much "uniqueness" in African legal systems.
" See Ademola, Personnel Problems in the Administration of justice in Nigeria, infra p. 576, at 58o.
" Especially constitution-makers outside of the Commonwealth might well heed the warning of
Needler, On the Dangers of Copying from the British, 57 POL. Sc. Q. 379 (1962).
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solidarity of constitutional conventions in the relationship between GovernorsGeneral (or Governors) and Premiers. 24 Such a solidarity seems understandable,
but still a bit strange to observers from the United States. Here, we turn to our
last point of inquiry. Why, it may be asked, has the United States contributed so
little to the constitutional law of the new African states, even the Anglophonic ones?
For as judged by the four standard criteria for differentiation between the United
States and the British constitutions (a written instrument, federalism, judicial
review, ministerial responsibility), the new African states such as Nigeria follow
the United States three times out of four.
One explanation-certainly not to be discounted-may be the predominantly
British (i.e., almost invariably English) training of the senior members of the bar
in Anglophonic African states. Another theory is a bit more circuitous and vastly
more flattering: the United States, the argument runs, influenced the B.N.A. Act
and the Australian constitution as well as (together with these two) the Indian
constitution. Consequently, it is contended, a constitution such as that of the
Federation of Nigeria, while ostensibly relying on Indian, Canadian, and Australian
models, is nevertheless basically shaped by United States constitutional concepts.
It is submitted that a third explanation-not claiming exclusive validity-is more
weighty. United States constitutional law is neatly divided into two categories: (i)
"litigious" constitutional law, i.e., the outcome-determinative impact of the Constitution on a huge array of the legal controversies of individuals and corporations with
and among each other, as well as their controversies with various governmental
organs; and (2) institutional public law, i.e., the structure, operation, and interaction of constitutional organs. Unfortunately, only the former, which is of relatively
secondary interest to constitution-makers, is regularly taught at the law schools.
And while there is probably no rival to United States political science in the methods
of case study of political processes, a foreign statesman may well hesitate to turn
to political scientists for counsel in the drafting of constitutional instruments.
The basic purpose of the above Foreword has been to suggest that African legal
problems are mainly unique because of the frequency of atypical situations; that
little danger to traditional "Western" values and concepts lurks in a specific "African"
conception of law, national or international; and that finally, the really singular
telescoping of articulate societal and legal development into an unprecedentedly short
time span affords the comparative scholar a splendid opportunity not only to see
other societies in actual development, but also to comprehend his own legal frame of
reference more thoroughly-and more modestly.
HANS W. BAADE.
24
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